Appearance
10.8 — Descartes to Hume: The Modern Break
Something changes in the seventeenth century, and the change is about where authority comes from.
Before: you establish a claim by showing it follows from an authoritative text or an accepted system.
After: you establish it by starting from something you can be certain of yourself, and building.
And the person who makes the break most explicitly is a French soldier sitting alone in a heated room in Germany in 1619.
Descartes
His problem: he noticed that a great many things he had been taught were false, and that he had no way of telling which.
His method: doubt everything that can possibly be doubted, and see what survives.
And he is systematic about it.
The senses deceive — sticks look bent in water, distant towers look round. So sensory evidence goes.
Dreams are convincing while you are in them (9.8 runs the same argument). So the whole external world might be a dream, and it goes.
Then comes the strongest version. Suppose there is a powerful deceiver whose whole purpose is to mislead me. Then even mathematics might be a trick. Perhaps I am made to go wrong every time I add.
What survives that?
One thing. If I am being deceived, I exist to be deceived.
Cogito, ergo sum. I think, therefore I am.
What the cogito actually establishes
Less than people think, and Descartes knew it.
It establishes that something is thinking, right now. It does not establish that there is a persistent self, that there is a body, that there is a world, or that any of your memories are real.
Descartes spends the rest of the Meditations trying to get from that one point back to the world. He does it with an argument for God's existence. Then he claims that a perfect God would not deceive him. Almost nobody thinks that part works. It is generally agreed that he never got out of the room.
Which leaves the modern problem: a certain starting point and no reliable route from it to anything else.
The dualism
And his other legacy, which caused more trouble than the doubt.
Two kinds of substance. Mind, which thinks and has no extension in space. Body, which is extended in space and does not think.
There was an immediate objection. Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia put it to him in a series of letters. How can a thinking thing that takes up no space move a thing that does? If mind has no location and no physical properties, what does it push?
Descartes suggested the pineal gland as the meeting point, which is not an answer.
Descartes never answered Elisabeth's objection. It is the same interaction problem that Samkhya has (9.4). It is the reason mind-body dualism is a minority position now. Nobody proved it false. The trouble is that nobody could say how it works.
The rationalists and the empiricists
And the eighteenth century divides into two camps over one question: where does knowledge come from?
Rationalists — Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz — say reason. Some knowledge is available prior to experience, and mathematics is the model.
Empiricists — Locke, Berkeley, Hume — say experience. The mind starts empty and everything is written on it by the senses.
Spinoza
Worth a paragraph because he is the most rigorous and the most personally admirable.
Excommunicated from the Amsterdam Jewish community at twenty-three, in the harshest terms on record, for his views. He ground lenses for a living, refused a professorship to keep his independence, and died at forty-four.
His system says there is only one substance, and you can call it God or Nature. Everything that exists is a mode of it, which means one particular way it shows itself. Mind and body are not two substances. They are the same thing described in two ways. This dissolves Descartes' problem. It removes the problem instead of answering it.
His ethics begins with a new idea of freedom. Freedom is not doing what you want. It is understanding why you want it. A person driven by passions they do not understand is not free. Understanding the causes of your own emotions changes them. Modern therapy makes the same claim. It is also close to the discrimination taught in 9.4.
Locke
The mind at birth is a blank sheet. All ideas come from sensation, or from reflection, which is the mind looking at its own workings.
And his political work matters more than his epistemology. Government exists by the consent of the governed, to protect life, liberty and property, and a government that violates that may be replaced. The American Declaration of Independence is Locke, nearly verbatim, and Volume VIII covers what followed.
Berkeley
Takes empiricism to its conclusion and gets a strange result.
If all we ever have is perceptions, what grounds the claim that there is matter behind them? Nothing. So there is no matter — to be is to be perceived.
Things continue to exist when unobserved because God perceives them.
Almost nobody accepts this and nobody can refute it cleanly. Samuel Johnson's famous response was to kick a stone and say "I refute it thus," which is not an argument and which everybody remembers.
Hume
And the empiricist who followed the logic all the way and produced results that alarmed everybody, including himself.
Causation
His most famous argument.
You see one billiard ball strike another and the second move. What do you actually observe?
One event, then another event, in that order, repeatedly.
You do not observe a necessary connection. There is no perception of "causing." You see one thing follow another, and you supply the sense that it had to happen.
Where does the supplying come from? Habit. You have seen it many times and you expect it. That expectation is a fact about your mind and not about the world.
This is Charvaka's problem of induction (9.10), arrived at independently, and it has never been solved. Every scientific law rests on the assumption that the future will resemble the past, and there is no non-circular argument for that assumption — any argument for it will itself use induction.
The self
And the other one, which is more startling.
Look for the self. What do you find?
"When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other — of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception."
So Hume concludes that there is no self, only a bundle of perceptions in constant flux. Whenever he looked, he found perceptions and never a self.
This is the idea of 6.7, found again in Edinburgh in 1739. It is the Buddha's argument, reached independently by the same steps. You look for the self, and you report that the search fails.
And Hume was not satisfied with it. In an appendix he admits he cannot make his account of personal identity work and does not know how to fix it, which is an unusual thing for a philosopher to publish.
Is and ought
And the observation that changed ethics.
He notices that writers on morality proceed for a while with ordinary claims about what is the case, and then suddenly all the sentences are about what ought to be — and the transition is never explained.
You cannot derive an ought from an is. No collection of facts about the world entails a value, without a value premise smuggled in somewhere.
This is the is-ought problem and Part 13 has to deal with it.
What the period established
Three things.
That you can start from your own experience and reason rather than from authority. Modern thinking is built on this step.
That the mind-body relationship is a genuine problem, and 15.2 says it still is.
The third is that empiricism, followed honestly, undermines a great deal that everybody assumed. Empiricism is the view that all knowledge comes from experience. It undermines our idea of causation, our idea of the self, and the way we derive values. Hume did not mean to destroy anything. He followed the argument where it led.
Kant said Hume woke him from his dogmatic slumber, and 10.9 is the response.
What to carry from this page
Doubt everything you can and see what survives. You will get less than you hoped, and the exercise is worth doing once.
You do not observe causation. You see one thing follow another, and you supply the rest. It is good to remember this whenever you feel certain that one thing produced another.
Look for the self and you find perceptions. Two traditions, two millennia apart, same procedure, same result.
And no set of facts entails a value on its own. Every argument that jumps from "this is how things are" to "therefore you should" has a hidden premise, and finding it is the most useful analytical habit in this Part.
Next: 10.9 — the man who tried to put it all back together, and the moral rule you can state in one sentence.