Appearance
15.2 — Consciousness: The Hard Problem, Honestly
Here is the problem, stated as plainly as it can be.
There is something it is like to be you.
Red looks like something. Pain feels like something. A cello sounds like something.
And nothing in the physical description of your brain explains why.
The easy and the hard problems
The distinction was named by David Chalmers in 1995 and it is the right one.
The easy problems are about what the brain does. How does it tell one stimulus from another? How does it combine information? How does it report on its own states? How does it focus attention, control behaviour, and tell waking from sleep?
These are called easy not because they are simple — they are enormously difficult and will take another century — but because we know what an answer would look like. You specify a mechanism, and the problem is solved.
The hard problem: why is any of that accompanied by experience?
A system could, in principle, do all of the processing — discriminate red, report "that is red," behave appropriately — with nothing it is like to be it.
And it is not.
Why?
Why it is not a normal scientific problem
Because of what an explanation would have to do.
Every other successful explanation in science reduces a phenomenon to a mechanism. Heat is molecular motion. Life is chemistry. Lightning is electrical discharge.
And in each case, once you have the mechanism, the phenomenon is accounted for — there is no residue.
Here there is a residue, which means something is left over after the mechanism is explained. Imagine we listed every neuron, every connection and every chemical gradient. The question "why is there something it is like?" would still be waiting for an answer.
Which is either a sign that we do not yet have the right concepts, or a sign that this is a different kind of problem.
The positions
Five, and each has a cost.
Physicalism
Experience is a physical process, and the appearance of a residue is a confusion about concepts.
The strongest evidence is that experience depends on the brain. Every change to the brain changes experience in a matching way. Anaesthesia removes experience, and it can be reversed. Damage to one area removes specific parts of experience. Chemicals shift it. Nobody has ever seen something happen to a mind without something happening to a brain.
The cost is that physicalism has not explained the residue. The usual reply is that the hard problem will dissolve once the easy problems are solved. That reply is a promise, and it has gone unpaid for thirty years.
Illusionism
The stronger version: there is no hard problem, because the phenomenal properties we think we have are not real. The brain represents itself as having them, and the representation is inaccurate.
The cost: it is very difficult to state without seeming to deny the most certain thing anybody has. Descartes' point (10.8) applies: whatever else is doubtful, the experiencing is not.
Dualism
Mind and matter are distinct. Descartes' position (10.8), and Samkhya's (9.4).
The cost is the interaction problem, and it was raised immediately by Princess Elisabeth and has never been answered. If mind has no physical properties, what does it push?
Panpsychism
Experience is a basic feature of matter. It is present everywhere, even if only in a tiny form. Complex experience is built up from simple experience.
Currently taken seriously by a number of philosophers, which surprises people. Its attraction: it does not have to explain how experience arises from non-experience, because it never does.
The cost is the combination problem: how do many tiny experiences combine into one unified experience? Nobody has an account, and it may be as hard as the original problem.
And idealism
Idealism says that consciousness is the basic thing. Matter comes from it and depends on it.
Which is Advaita's position (9.8), and the Upanishads' (9.2): prajnanam brahma, consciousness is the ultimate reality.
The cost: it has to explain why the physical world behaves so lawfully and so independently of anybody's mind, and it has to account for the extremely tight correlation between brain states and experience.
Where the traditions might actually have something
And this is the chapter's real point, and it should be stated carefully because it is easily overclaimed.
The contemplative traditions have done something science has not. For two and a half thousand years they have looked into the structure of experience from the inside. They did this in a systematic way, with trained people.
And they produced findings, in detail.
The sense of a unified self is built by the mind rather than simply given (6.7, 9.4). Awareness can be told apart from what it is aware of (5.5, 9.2). Attention can be trained, and how it works can be described (6.9, 9.5). Experience breaks down into parts. One example is the raw feeling-tone that comes before the reaction, in 6.8. This is a specific claim that can be checked.
And several of these have been independently reached from the outside.
The constructed self is broadly what cognitive science now says. The feeling-tone-before-reaction claim is consistent with what is known about affective processing being faster than deliberation. The trainability of attention is measurable.
So on the easy problems and on the structure of experience, the traditions have data. Some of that data has held up.
On the hard problem, they have a position rather than a finding. "Consciousness is fundamental" is an answer and it is not established, and the traditions that hold it disagree with each other about what follows (9.4 against 9.8, and 6.7 against both).
What is honestly known
Assemble it.
Consciousness depends on the brain in extraordinary detail. This is not in doubt and any position has to accommodate it.
Specific correlates have been found. Certain patterns of activity accompany conscious perception and are absent when the same stimulus is processed unconsciously.
Several theories exist — integrated information, global workspace, higher-order representation, predictive processing — and each explains some of the data and none has won.
And no theory has an account of why there is experience.
Nobody has closed the gap and nobody has shown the gap is illusory.
What follows practically
Three things, because this is not only an academic question.
Nobody is entitled to certainty here. A confident materialist and a confident idealist are both overreaching, and 15.1's rule applies to both.
The practical content of the traditions does not depend on the answer. 5.5's gap between the observer and the observed is available whether it is a metaphysical fact or a trick of attention, and it works either way.
And the openness of this question is why 14.1's door is not fully closed. We do not have a complete account of what consciousness is, which limits how confident anybody can be about what happens to it.
That is not an argument for survival. It is an argument against certainty, in a domain where certainty is offered constantly from both directions.
What to carry from this page
Every physical fact about your brain could be known and the question "why is there something it is like?" would still be standing.
Five positions, five costs, no winner. And the promissory note that the hard problem will dissolve has been outstanding for thirty years.
The traditions have real data on the structure of experience. On why there is any experience at all, they hold a position, not a finding.
Nobody is entitled to certainty here. Please remember this the next time somebody tells you confidently what you are.
Next: 15.3 — the wonder this volume was asked about directly: nothing is truly still, and where the energy comes from.